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Apostrophe and Apocalypse: 
Notes on Theatricality in Jacques Derrida’s “Envois”
Abstract. This article aims at uncovering and interpreting the selected theatrical 
tropes in Jacques Derrida’s “Envois” in relation to an interpretative path paved by 
Samuel Weber in Theatricality as Medium. Following Weber’s intuitions, “Envois” 
is read as a process of staging the postulates posed by Derrida in his previous works, 
including “Freud and the Scene of Writing” or “Envoi.” The logic of staging, as 
it  is argued,  relies first and foremost on  the  trope of apostrophe, understood both 
as an act of addressing somebody and a punctuation mark. Derrida’s spectral 
correspondence—in which addressees, addressers, destinations, and postcards 
themselves engage in an ongoing play of hide and seek—employs the performative 
aspect of apostrophe in order to keep the deconstructive wheel in motion, in search 
of the genuine intimacy with the other. By means of numerous encrypted and 
deciphered events, actual and fictional encounters, allusions to the fort/da scene and 
the mirror stage, or the revisions of Matthew Paris’s illustration of Socrates and 
Plato, Derrida invites readers to immerse themselves in the ghostly exchange and 
its inherent temporal and spatial twists; the stake of this task is to follow the link 
joining apo-strophe with apo-calypse, with regard to the catastrophe that resides 
between them.
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Although theatricality has never occupied a central position in Jacques 
Derrida’s writings, it seems that its ghosts persistently percolate through 
them. Samuel Weber points out that in “Double Session,” a text devoted 
to Stephane Mallarmé’s closet drama, Derrida “moves from a purely 
‘theoretical’ discourse, describing an object independent of it, to a ‘theatrical’ 
mode of (re)writing that stages (dislocates) what it also recites: the theatrical 
movement of Mallarmé’s writing” (2004a: 14, emphasis in the original). 
Weber continues: “In the almost four decades since this essay was published, 
Derrida’s writing has not ceased to demonstrate and explore, with increasing 
explicitness and variety, its own theatrical quality as a ‘staging’ or mise en 
scène, rather than as an essentially constative reading of something held to 
exist independently of it” (2004a: 14, emphasis in the original). Be it through 
the spectral dialogue of the two columns of Glas, the selection of earlier 
works and their re-readings on separate sides of Cinders, the director’s 
notes smuggled into Specters of Marx,  or  finally  the  enigmatic  postcards 
of “Envois,” Derrida attempts to utilize the materiality of the paper as an 
interruptive instance hindering a spatial-temporal standstill threatening 
every  single  act  of  writing.  Just  as  drama  opens  itself  up  to  an  infinite 
number of possible performances, revisions, and interpretations, the stages 
Derrida so eagerly constructs aim at guaranteeing the ongoing, iterable 
replication of differences, which cannot be easily put down as a subtle form 
of logocentrism.
Let us shift towards another founding father of Weber’s theory 
of theatricality—Walter Benjamin. For Benjamin, what the Copernican 
Revolution of the Epic Theatre has irreversibly changed is the confirmation 
that theatrical gestures are citable, that is, both quotable and prone to be 
put in motion, following Latin citere. Unlike human actions, gestures—
even if they are but speech acts, as Derrida perhaps would argue—have 
definite beginnings and ends. According to Weber, citability is the capability 
of being moved from site to site, with our sights oriented towards that which 
is to come (Weber 1996). Furthermore, both German zieteren and English 
to cite equally signify the action of breaking the movement, of “arresting 
it” (Weber 1996). Due to its potential citability, the gesture thus becomes 
a fixed element within a greater fluctuating form. Consequently, as Weber 
reinterprets this observation, “a gesture . . . interrupts and suspends . . . 
the intentional-teleological-narrative movement toward a meaningful 
goal and thereby opens up the possibility of a different kind of space, that 
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of an incommensurable singularity” (2004b: 46). Such a singularity marks 
the  withdrawal  from  treating  theatrical  works  as  fixed  forms,  privileging 
sudden ruptures they bring instead. Inherently discontinuous, theatre thus 
becomes the most suitable space of Derridean iterability as it relies on the 
acts of citation—or repetition—which at the end of the day does not replicate 
a source element, but rather produces a sheer novelty instead. 
This article aims at mapping and exploring selected theatrical tropes 
in Jacques Derrida’s “Envois,” which, as I believe, reaches the peak of the 
strategy indicated by Weber. Firstly, on the postcards included in it, not 
only does Derrida re-play (or reply to) and re-stage the fort/da scene and 
the mirror stage (the founding spectacles of psychoanalysis), but also he 
reconstructs numerous encrypted and deciphered events, actual and fictional 
encounters, and stubbornly revises Matthew Paris’s illustration of Socrates 
and Plato. Secondly, while writing about these issues, he persistently returns 
to the figures of apostrophe, tragedy, scene, catastrophe, and theatre, both on 
their textual and performative or material strata. In my reading, I endeavour 
to focus on the latter manifestation. I will try to extract the deconstructive 
trope of apostrophe, which Derrida frequently employs and ponders upon 
in his spectral correspondence. Eventually, I will try to trace the course 
from apo-strophe to apo-calypse, followed by the postcards, with regard to 
catastrophe that resides between them. 
Staging the Apostrophe
What is the relation binding Derrida’s two autonomous texts, “Envoi” 
and “Envois”? What is the functional link between the philosophical essay on 
Martin Heidegger and the epistolary quasi-novel, respectively? If one sticks 
to Weber’s account of citability and its association to iterability, it might 
be argued that the latter text stages the critique the former puts forward 
in a sequence of scattered gestures. Simon Critchley summarizes Derrida’s 
attack carried out in “Envoi” as follows: 
What is being challenged by Derrida is the unilateralism 
of Heidegger’s claim that there is a sending (envoi; Schickung) 
of Being from the Greeks through epochs of increasing oblivion, 
which is gathered into the destiny or destination of Being (das 
Seins-Geschick) at the end of philosophy. (2014: 84, emphasis 
in the original)
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In other words, there is no being (l’être) wandering through the history 
of philosophy; there are only letters (lettres). Instead of an apocalyptic 
revelation, there is only the ongoing play of concealing and revealing 
scattered and fragmentary particles. Consequently, instead of a complete 
form, there are only discontinuous stagings. Yet, Derrida is aware of the 
danger of a subtly hidden logocentrism that his critique might smuggle, 
and hence he attempts to immunize it by means of both unfolding “Envoi” 
as homophonous with “Envois,” and by writing the latter as a network 
of deconstructive practices which are already at work.
As  I  am convinced,  a figure  that  is  capable of  shedding  light  on  this 
intricate network is that of apostrophe. To put it bluntly, “Envois” as 
a  selection  of  postcards  is  first  and  foremost  an  apostrophe. As  Derrida 
ensures its reader(s) in its opening sentence, “[y]ou might read these envois 
as the preface to a book that I have not written” (1987: 3). Moreover, in his 
biography authored by Benoit Peeters, it is pointed out that in 1977 Derrida 
worked on the project entitled Freud’s Legacy, consisting of “Le facteur 
de la vérité,” a text on Beyond the Pleasure Principle, and a preface, later 
included in The Post Card, yet “[a]t that stage the ‘Envois’ were not part 
of  the  project  at  all”  (Peeters  2012:  295).  No matter  how  fixed  the  final 
composition of The Post Card is, “Envois” seems to wander off the rest 
of the contents. It happens to be a preface without the book, a paratext 
without its constitutive text, and a set of postcards without their proper 
destinations; as a speech act it is oriented towards the matter which is either 
concealed or absent, yet simultaneously this displacement of an addressee 
does not annul the process, but rather maintains it. This is precisely the first 
side of apostrophe Derrida is fascinated with. Etymologically speaking, 
apostrophe stems from strephein: a turn or an act of turning away. Hence, 
apostrophe as a figure—no matter whether in a play or a poem—is anchored 
in the foundational break; it suspends the chain of events and silences all 
the other speakers in order to privilege a third party, be it a deity, a muse, an 
audience, or a reader. However, this gesture by no means guarantees that the 
apostrophic speech will not be eavesdropped or appropriated by someone not 
entitled to do it. Consequently, the addressed deities turn out to be readers, 
crimes plotted aside—common knowledge of the audience, and general turn 
to the audience—intimate experience of each of its members.
Postcards—due to their form—are exposed to similar dangers. Just like 
letters, they might reach wrong places or people, they might come later than 
expected, or they might not be received by any addressee at all. Unlike them, 
however, postcards are not carried in envelopes, and therefore they remain 
ceaselessly exposed to the other. We never know who has read them before us 
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and whether somebody has changed the messages written on them. Derrida, 
fond of the analogy binding together postcards and apostrophe, describes the 
strategy of “Envois”:
Thus I apostrophize. This too is a genre one can afford oneself, the 
apostrophe. A genre and a tone. The word—apostrophizes—speaks 
of the word addressed to the singular one, a live interpellation (the 
man of discourse or writing interrupts the continuous development 
of the sequence, abruptly turns toward someone, that is, something, 
addresses himself to you), but the word also speaks of the address 
to be detoured. (1987: 4) 
Through the announced play of one addressee and a detour, Derrida 
numerously shifts tones in “Envois,” from love letters to readings of Freud 
and Heidegger, from private reports on daily events to provocative erotic 
messages and visions of death, never entirely ensuring us who is speaking at 
the very moment, and who is presupposed as an addressee. Real events merge 
with fictional encounters, whereas philosophical meditations intertwine with 
mockery and intimate desires.
Radical discontinuity performed in “Envois” leads us to the 
aforementioned other side of apostrophe: apostrophe as a punctuation mark. 
Derrida writes: “In question might be a proper name or a punctuation mark, 
just like the apostrophe that replaces an elided letter, a word, one or several 
letters, in question might be brief or very long sentences, numerous or 
scant, that occasionally were themselves originally unterminated” (1987: 4, 
emphasis mine). Apostrophe in this sense marks an absence. It results from 
the substitution of a textual element with a sign staging the break in the word. 
But what kind of letters are elided by means of apostrophe? If “Envois” indeed 
consists of apostrophes, then the apostrophized segments displace not only 
their proper addresses, but also each of the messages. Precisely, through the 
passages omitted and indicated in the text through the blank spaces, Derrida 
reminds us that the typed content might be equally misleading. Firstly, they 
might be apostrophes per se—effects of substituting one content with another 
one, with no guarantee whether one is reading the initial text or the mark 
of its dislocation. Secondly, because of the logic of apostrophe, each of the 
envois never reaches its final and fixed form, but partakes in an undecidable 
movement oriented towards possible alterations and transactions to come. 




Rendering Derrida’s ghostly postcards as apostrophic inevitably leads 
us to the notion of an archive. Michael Naas argues:
From the very beginning of his work right up to the very end, 
Derrida was . . . preoccupied in a particularly acute way by the 
archive, sensitive from the very beginning to the way in which past 
discourses, past archives, come to occupy the terrain in advance, 
sensitive, therefore, to the impossibility of ever escaping the 
archive, though also to the undesirability of ever wishing to do so. 
(2015: 126, emphasis in the original)
On the spatial level, the text of “Envois” is a result of an arbitrary 
selection: the envois included are governed by the particular order, while its 
reader can never be entirely sure what scope of Derrida’s correspondence 
is indeed included in it, and how it has been manipulated prior to the 
publication. However, just as in “Différance,” instead of speaking 
of metaphysical and transcended being [l’être], Derrida focuses on the 
letter a [la lettre a] (Derrida 1982a: 3–4), in “Envois” apostrophe, already 
inscribed as a split in being [l’être], is transformed into a letter [la lettre] 
opened up to the logic of movement, dislocation, and other contingent postal 
conditions. Consequently, the text of “Envois” is constantly staging its 
capability of saving and preserving messages, and the dangers that might 
interfere with their readability. The temporal level of the postal archive 
is often recalled through Matthew Paris’s illustration with Plato dictating 
Socrates what to write. This accidental apostrophe which could not have 
taken place shows a similar coincidence, occurring when a postcard from 
a holiday reaches us after the arrival of its addresser. Derrida calls this 
sudden twist of temporalities—resurfacing numerously in the case of the 
mentioned illustration—catastrophe: kata-strephein or an overturn. After all, 
since Socrates has not left any written texts and most of our knowledge about 
him is already mediated by others, the origins of philosophy turn out to be 
the origins of the archive, haunted by spectres appropriating and interrupting 
the linear course of time, re-citing past elsewhere as the upcoming past, as 
if from beyond the grave. Once again, there is no being sent for us from the 
Greeks; there are only postcards.
Wandering postcards, written (and overwritten) by ghosts to ghosts, 
happen to keep the turning wheel of catastrophe in motion as it rolls through 
iterable concealments and revelations, hence their apocalyptic tone. On 
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the one hand, for instance in “No Apocalypse, Not Now” (1984) and “Of 
an Apocalyptic Tone Recently Adopted in Philosophy” (1982b), Derrida 
perceives apocalypse as a logocentric structure anchored in the transcendent 
name that is promised to be eventually revealed, while the secret it keeps—
entirely and widely comprehended. This is one of the reasons of Derrida’s 
robust critique of Heidegger in “Envoi” (in the singular) and the counter-
model presented in The Post Card. On the other hand, there is another 
apocalypse in “Envois,” rooted in apo-kalyptein, that is—the act of speaking 
from the concealed position, whose address and destination cannot be traced. 
For John D. Caputo, this form of apocalypse might be considered as “an 
apocalypse sans apocalypse, an apocalypse of the sans, of the secret sans 
verité . . .” (Caputo 1997: 95): the apocalypse without a presupposed horizon 
of expectation and openness to the fact that any post may suddenly call us to 
abandon it. Instead of addressing the ultimate event, the apocalypse-without-
apocalypse rehearses its intrinsic spectacle, and through this rehearsal—if 
one keeps in mind that for Derrida repetition always involves a production 
of differences—maintains the ongoing differing and deferring. 
The iterable and haunting sense of apocalypse can be easily spotted 
in Derrida’s Specters of Marx and its opening reading of Hamlet. In fact, 
the father’s spirit reveals the secret of the king’s death and the name of the 
murderer, whereas the legitimacy of the ghost’s words relies solely on 
Hamlet’s oath (Derrida 2006: 6–7). This asymmetrical relation with ghosts 
stems from the visor effect, which protects the identity of the spectre and 
forces us to take the other exclusively by its word (Derrida 2006: 6–8). 
Similarly, “Envois” seems to announce that any reaching of the addressee 
is in fact received by the other, whereas the pure moment of being together 
with the others is disrupted by the necessity of an addressee or a destination. 
In this place, the visor or la visière known from Specters of Marx meets 
the rear mirror of “Envois,” le rétroviseur, in a ghostly encounter. The 
automotive metaphors in “Envois,” as Alan Bass notes, originate in their 
common etymological root, since vois of envois and voi of voiture commonly 
stem from Latin via (1987: xvi–xvii). At the same time, an automobile, to 
play on this word for a little longer, is something which automatically and 
autonomously puts itself in motion. The rear mirror allows one to turn without 
the actual turning around to check what is spatially behind. Anchored in the 
French word rétroviseur, it provides one with the capability of reacting to the 
events before they actually happen. As a metonymy of catastrophe, the rear 
mirror is subject to the ongoing play of covering and unveiling, supporting 
Derrida’s impasse with the other. After all, it is a mirror which does not aim 
at reflecting the one who is looking at it; it is a mirror that cannot equally 
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reflect two people sitting next to each other. Finally, it is a viseur, a sight, 
which indeed enhances vision, although by means of diverting it.
As we can judge from Derrida’s focus on checking whether he is not 
followed, the lovers’ secret meetings, both evading others and stimulated by 
their possible and intimate presence, might imply a refiguration of apocalypse 
from the ultimate spectacle at the end of time into a mode of either postal 
or spectral intrusion of the other. Just as there is no ultimate sending from 
the Greeks, the Biblical history also does not identify an addresser, an 
envoi wandering  through  the epochs, and  its final destination. We have  to 
bear in mind that the seven missives known from the Apocalypse—just 
as sendings or envois—are exposed to the danger of missing their proper 
destinations and addressees, whereas John, firstly an addressee (as a prophet) 
and later an addresser (as a writer) of the whole revelation, happens to be 
a name subsuming an unknown number of authors under itself. Apocalypse, 
therefore, in its very core seems to deprive itself of apocalypse, dividing 
its one promised envoi into the sendings spreading within the catastrophic 
correspondence. It might be claimed that apocalypse is but apostrophe, whose 
message is both interrupting and interrupted. Importantly enough, in Faith 
and Knowledge Derrida claims that revelation (Offenbarung) is inherently 
presupposed by the mechanical revealability (Offenbarkeit) (1998: 16). Yet, 
what is there to be revealed or opened (following German öffnen) if postcards 
are not carried in envelopes, and everyone who dares halt them believes that 
he or she “opens” them for the very first time?
Maintaining the Intimacy
The ontological and apocalyptic perspectives hinted above by no means 
transport us far from the mundane events and secret lovers’ accounts Derrida’s 
epistolary piece delineates; all of these tropes, in fact, might be subsumed 
under the common yearning for maintaining the intimate. Apostrophe alone 
aims at fulfilling this task, since it either signifies the decision to address the 
other or marks the elided letter with a punctuation mark, and then establishes 
the congruence between the substituted content and the sign which replaces 
it. However, intimacy itself might turn into a dangerous logocentric structure, 
and consequently fetishize the other. The ontological and apocalyptic 
projects open themselves to the juncture at the end of times, understood as 
something they inherently lack, yet pose it via the specified link to their own 
origins. The idea of fulfilling the circle falls back into a deconstructive trap 
not only because it mistakes the exterior event with the quality that is already 
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presupposed, but also because it claims that the very same event guarantees 
a closure. The catastrophic twists “Envois” introduces aim at deconstructing 
such a seeming standstill. By the same token, the ongoing correspondence 
can never reach the point of an absolute certitude, be it that of an addresser, 
an addressee, or a content; it would replace the otherness with an instance 
of an “I.” 
For Catherine Malabou, “[t]he catastrophe or dangerous reversal results 
from a collision-which is at the same time by chance and of necessity—between 
the desire for an absolute intimacy with the other and the very impossibility 
of every joining together” (Malabou and Derrida 2004: 195). Still, against 
this statement, I believe that the absolute intimacy should not be mistaken 
with an ultimate reunion, but rather identified as the unexhausted possibility 
of maintaining the motion. Putting it bluntly, after the “joining-together,” 
there is nobody to whom one may write. The otherness fuelled by the postal 
principles dissipates during the encounter, which by no means retrieves 
the other “inhabiting” the postcards. There is being instead of the letters. 
However, if indeed postcards included in “Envois” are citable gestures—in 
other words, if they operate according to the principle of iterability—then 
one should no longer focus on the intimacy with the other, but rather the 
intimacy with the machinery producing the otherness. 
In “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” Derrida postulates that Sigmund 
Freud’s teachings on the unconscious should be re-educated by means of the 
self-sufficient machine,  supplementing  it with a  radicalized understanding 
of a trace (2001: 287–289). “Envois,” in turn, demonstrates how such 
a machine could work. Perhaps this provides one with a reason why Derrida, 
in  his  spectral  correspondence,  reconfigures  two  foundational  spectacles 
of psychoanalysis, and aims at depriving them of their hidden instances 
of a  standstill. The first one  is  the mirror  stage, which Derrida  tackles by 
means of his descriptions of the rear mirror in a car. Lacanian mirror stage 
points to a moment when an infant captures its own reflection in a looking 
glass, dividing its own identity into the “I” and “non-I” (Lacan 2006). The 
incompatibility of the two and the striking congruence between both sides 
of a mirror result in a need for language capable of differentiation. Nonetheless, 
the identity is split, since it cannot absorb or reject the foundational lack. 
An integrity of a person is therefore rooted in the impossibility of such 
an integrity, which numerously resurfaces in adult life by means of those 
traumatic moments which bring the linguistic cognition to the extreme. The 
second spectacle covers the fort/da scene, which Freud himself observes on 
the example of young Ernst and describes in detail in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle. According to Freud, his grandson repetitively throws away and 
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pulls back a reel tied to a string. As the psychoanalyst claims, this gesture, 
in fact, reveals a process of working through the symbolic loss of the mother. 
The movement of the reel indicates the never complete transition from 
closeness to absence in the very moment when the boy endeavours to accept 
the lack (Freud 2010: 17).
Both cases are recalled by Derrida because of their seeming opening 
towards motion, which at some point becomes arrested in a standstill, 
depriving the other of its autonomy. In the case of the mirror stage, Derrida 
points to the rear mirror stage in which there is never one “non-I.” Rather, 
all of the scenes with the rear mirror indicate the reciprocity and constant 
movement of the same and the other, which by no means inhabit separate 
realms, even if the frontiers can be easily traversed. Instead, in the process 
of writing and staging, they interweave within an intense production 
of differences, whose maintenance drives a parallel fascination and 
exploration of the matrix that makes such a relation possible. When fort/
da scenes are rendered in “Envois,” the stake remains similar; the burning 
question which is raised is— “Who is the object of Hans’s working through 
in each of the cases?” Once again, Derrida, by means of writing and staging, 
radicalizes the differing and deferring of his spectral correspondence, and 
exposes the temporal and spatial intricacies of the otherness that these two 
psychoanalytical scenes have aimed to put in a standstill. 
Concluding, in my article I have tried to examine how the theatrical tropes 
of apostrophe and catastrophe are both indicated and staged in “Envois.” 
By associating them with the figure of apocalypse, Derrida engages in the 
discourse of revealability and concealment, or preservation and recollection, 
demonstrating how the postal principle reflects itself in writing, and includes 
us in its archival and spectral processes. Consequently, apostrophe orients 
us to the undecidability lying in the heart of every correspondence, fostering 
its intimacy with the others and exposing us to the expanding distance 
between us and them. This tragedy is performed through the ongoing shifting 
of  theatrical  figures,  staged  textual  tropes,  and  textualized  staged  events. 
The psychoanalytical spectacles, targeted specifically, recall the intricacies 
of a spectral correspondence Derrida aims to explore. Instead of inter-acting 
with possible addressees and readers, envois as a form intra-acts with them, 
to use Karen Barad’s term (2007: 101), and includes them as productive 
agencies partaking within the immanent movement through different posts, 
blurred spatial boundaries, and anachronic temporal relations.
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